University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1990

Bart Bartosic: What You See Is Not What You Get
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School, tstanton@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/482

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legal Biography Commons
Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "Bart Bartosic: What You See Is Not What You Get." U. C. Davis L. Rev. 24 (1990): 13-7.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

Tribute

1990]

BART BARTOSIC: WHAT YOU SEE Is NOT WHAT You GET

TheodoreJ. St. Antoine*

With "Bart" Bartosic, what you see is not necessarily what you
get. Anyone even vaguely acquainted with him knows I am not
talking about duplicity; on occasion, Bart can be almost painfully
forthright. Nonetheless, on first meeting, most persons are likely
to view him as the very soul of politesse - perhaps actually too
deferential and accommodating. Yet behind that beguiling exterior can be found a backbone of cast iron, a mind like a steel trap,
and (to extend the metallic figure) a willingness, when the situation demands, to be as hard as nails in dealing with either ideas or
people.
I worked for Bart in my first full-time job as a lawyer in the late
1950s. He was the staff director of a novel instrument of equity, a
tripartite "board of monitors" that was set up by the federal district court in the District of Columbia to try to ride herd on jimmy
Hoffa and the Teamsters Union, following Hoffa's disputed election as president of the international.' The Teamsters thought
they had the impartial chair of the board in their hip pocket
because he was an old-line union attorney who had briefly represented the Teamsters themselves. But Hoffa, displaying a total
lack of diplomacy, as well as of the natural cunning with which he
was often erroneously credited, managed in a series of face-toface confrontations to so provoke the chair's Irish temper that the
latter, abandoning nearly all claims to impartiality, set out to
bring Hoffa to heel, if not to bring him down.
Bart reacted in character. Like me, he was making his first fulltime foray as a lawyer into the "real world" outside academia.
That did not deter him, however, from remonstrating with his
strong-willed, impulsive chief. "But sir," he declared in his precise, measured tones, "under the consent decree establishing the
board, we have no authority to order the Teamsters to do anything; we can only recommend." "All right, then," came the growling
rejoinder,
"take
this
down
instead:
'Order of
Recommendation No. 1'.

. .

." Bart was enough of a realist to

bow to the inevitable, and the board soon became famous for sevDegan Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School.
I See English v. Cunningham, 269 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 897 (1959).
*
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eral dozen "orders of recommendation" covering many aspects
of the Teamsters' structure and procedures. Somewhat surprisingly, the union complied voluntarily with a substantial number of
these recommendations, much to the benefit, I like to think, of
the organization and its members. Eventually, some of our
"orders" cut too close to the bone and Hoffa and his cohorts
balked. That led to another round of litigation in which the District of Columbia Circuit ultimately vindicated Bart's judgment:
the Board had frequently sought to order when it could only
recommend.
Two incidents related to the monitorship, one trivial and one
significant, epitomize for me the polar elements of Bart's personality - his gentleness and his toughness. Once Bart and I were in
the office together, assembling a mass of papers. He was operating a heavy-duty stapler. I made some small request or offered
some suggestion; I have long since forgotten what. Bart bore
down on the stapler and at the same time uttered a loud and
forceful, "No!" He immediately turned to me, obviously distressed: "I'm sorry, Ted, I didn't mean to seem so emphatic. It
was only my pressure on the stapler that made me sound that
way!"
Much more serious was a career decision Bart made a year or so
later. After his stint with the Board of Monitors, he returned
briefly to the Washington headquarters of the National Labor
Relations Board. And then Jimmy Hoffa, who sometimes (but
rarely) knew what was good for him, offered Bart a position as
counsel for the Teamsters. Even though Bart would not be going
directly from the monitors to the union, I knew his old boss
would regard the move akin to high treason, and I told Bart so.
In addition, Bart was by now harboring thoughts of an eventual
return to law teaching, and we were not so far removed from the
McCarthy witch-hunt era but what I feared he might jeopardize
his chances with the more timorous schools by an association with
the much-maligned Teamsters. I am sure Bart gave my worries
all of a moments consideration, and then, as the grand
nonrespecter of persons he has always been, he did what he
thought he should do. Two million Teamster members were the
beneficiaries of a dozen years of his impeccable lawyering.
Curiously, I feel I have been less in touch with Bart's day-to-day
activities since he joined me in the academic world in 1971, even
though he spent his first decade at Wayne State Law School in
Detroit, a mere forty-five miles from Ann-Arbor, and provided
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Michigan Law School students with some much-applauded guest
teaching. Our relations became more attenuated when he moved
to the Coast in 1980, but tales of his prowess as Dean at Davis
drifted back from time to time - and confirmed the continuing
validity of my thesis concerning his dual hallmarks of gentleness
and toughness.
Fortunately, Bart's writings have enabled me to keep abreast of
his thinking over the years. The work reflects the man. He does
not shrink from tackling the largest, most overarching conceptual
themes. Yet he is not above dealing with the practitioner's more
mundane concerns. He exhibits the deepest compassion for the
disadvantaged. At the same time he can be scathing in his denunciation of shoddy performance, even at the highest levels.
In three substantial articles, Bart, either alone or in collaboration with Professor Gary Minda of Brooklyn Law School, has analyzed the output of the Burger Court from its earliest days to its
conclusion. The verdict has often been harsh: "Most of the present Court's significant labor opinions are wanting in logic, style
and grace."' There has been a persistent complaint. The decisions are "murky and mediocre because the Supreme Court lacks
a consistent and coherent theory of labor law." 3 And finally, "if
there is one single theme that characterizes the labor law legacy
of the Burger Court, it is the failure of imagination and vision in
deciding labor law policy." 4
Perhaps Bart and his co-author are the most focused and eloquent in decrying the "lack of consensus during the Burger Court
era on affirmative action doctrine." 5 They attribute this failure to
the conflict between those who believe that affirmative action
must be confined to "remedying individual discriminatory acts"
and those who believe it should extend to "vindicating group

rights and . . .correct[ing] societal patterns of injustice." 6 They

propose a more factually based approach:
Instead of choosing between abstract models, the Court
should be focusing more of its attention on the realities of racism
2 Bartosic, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term: TheAllocation of Power in Deciding
Labor Law Policy, 62 VA. L. REV. 533, 600 (1976).
3 Bartosic & Minda, Labor Law Myth in the Supreme Court, 1981 Term: A Plea
for Realistic and Coherent Theory, 30 UCLA L. REV. 271, 326 (1982).
4 Bartosic & Minda, The Labor Law Legacy of the Burger Court's Last Term: A
Failureof Imagination and Vision, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 591 (1986).
5 Id. at 553.
6

Id.
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and racial hierarchy. Much of the discussion on affirmative
action in the Supreme Court simply ignores the stark realities
besetting blacks and Hispanics in American society.7

Quite correctly, the authors close by observing that the Burger
Court produced no "authoritative pronouncement" in seventeen
years on the most "significant and serious questions posed by
race-conscious affirmative action. '"8 The contrast with the Warren Court's handling of school segregation 9 and reapportionment' o is indeed striking. But in fairness I think the moral
dilemma of affirmative action cuts far deeper among fair-minded
people, and the public is much less ready here to follow the lead
of the Supreme Court.
On a less heroic but still vital level, Bart has had a great deal to
say about the effective enforcement of substantive rights. He
accurately identifies procedural delay and inadequate remedies as
the "principal stumbling block[s]" to effectuation of national
labor policy, and calls for a new labor court to review NLRB decisions and for increased use of the contempt power as the solutions. " I heartily endorse the latter proposal, having never
understood the reluctance of both the Labor Board and the
courts to put some flagrant and persistent management (and
union) malefactors behind bars just because they wear white collars. But I am still convinced there is a genuine value in having
the decisions of specialists reviewed by generalists - especially if
the latter are more likely to be considered the more prestigious
appointments - and so I remain skeptical about Bart's labor
court. Lastly, in keeping with his emphasis upon the actualization
of theoretically available claims, Bart and a former colleague from
active practice have written one of the most comprehensive and
persuasive statements in support of the expansion of group legal
services for the middle class, particularly for workers through colId. at 555.
Id. at 591.
9 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (unanimously
decided).
10 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (with only Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
7
8

II Bartosic, Labor Law Reform - The NLRB and a Labor Court, 4 GA. L.
647 (1970); Bartosic & Lanoff, Escalatingthe Struggle against Taft-Hartley
Contemnors, 39 U. CHi. L. REV. 255, 255 (1972); see also Bartosic & Minda,
Union Fiduciaries,Attorneys, and Conflicts of Interest, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 227
REV.

(1981) (advocating an independent regulatory agency to administer the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
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lective bargaining. 2
A strong strain of thinking in certain elite circles of the contemporary law school world holds that writing addressed primarily to
the practicing bar, including well-crafted and eminently useful
treatises, is inherently inferior to the loftier flights of the creative
imagination that a scholar addresses to a favored few, often only a
handful of his or her fellow scholars. Bart is keenly aware of
those hierarchical attitudes. He was also the Dean of a truly fine
law school, which has achieved much in short order, and
undoubtedly aspires to much more. Taking all that into account,
I reserve my highest and warmest esteem for a Dean - responsible as he was for serving as a model for many young, ambitious,
anxious faculty members - who would dare to produce a mere
treatise on American Labor Law. i" That it happens to be the best
up-to-date work of its kind is a nice bonus. Its real message, however, to all young, ambitious, anxious faculty members everywhere, from a Dean who has been through many wars, is simply
this: "I am my own man. You be yours."
12 Bartosic & Bernstein, Group Legal Services as a Fringe Benefit: Lawyers for
Forgotten Clients through Collective Bargaining, 59 VA. L. REV. 410 (1973).
13 F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR (2d ed. 1986); see also Bartosic & Hartley, What To Do When Employers
Discriminate Against Unions (Part 1), PRAc. LAw., Mar. 1987, at 33; (Part 2),
PRAc. LAw., Apr. 1987, at 75.
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